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In England and Wales, legislation pertaining to hate crime recognizes hostility 
based on racial identity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, disability or 
transgender identity. Discussions abound as to whether this legislation should also 
recognize hostility based on gender or misogyny. Taking a socio-legal analysis, the 
chapter examines hate crime, gender-based victimization and misogyny alongside 
the impact of victim identity construction, access to justice and the international 
nature of gendered harm. The chapter provides a comprehensive investigation of 
gender-based victimization in relation to targeted hostility to assess the potential 
for its inclusion in hate crime legislation in England and Wales.
Keywords: gender hostility; hate crime; violence against women;  
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IntroductIon
in 2018, the law Commission for england and Wales began reviewing the 
adequacy and parity of legal protections around hate crime. two key areas of 
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potential reform included inequalities among the currently recognized protected 
characteristics of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender 
identity (an issue previously identified in their 2013 review), and potentially 
including new characteristics such as sex, gender, age, or physical attributes. the 
law Commission review sought to understand how particular characteristics 
should be determined, what the threshold of hostile criminal behaviors might be, 
and how any changes to existing legislation might affect the concept of hate crime 
itself. as this chapter will explore, the potential inclusion of sex or gender as a rec-
ognized ground for hostility is a welcome development for tackling gender-based 
victimization and violence against women, however whether this alone will have a 
realistic impact on reducing gendered victimization is questionable.
hate crime has been described as “a concept which has inspired legal and social 
change designed to protect people from being persecuted simply because of who 
they are, or who they are perceived to be” (Chakraborti, 2015, p. 13). hate crimes 
often stem from prejudice toward a group or individual whose identity has been 
subject to negative rhetoric or ideology by dominant members of society (lyons, 
2006). in the global north, the term has rapidly become a useful shorthand way 
of referring to targeted victimization fueled by hate, hostility, bias or prejudice 
and their related criminal offences (Chakraborti & garland, 2009; perry, 2001). 
perry (2001, p. 10) offers the following useful and informative definition that has 
become commonplace as a starting point of analysis in hate crime scholarship:
[hate Crime] involves acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed toward already stig-
matized and marginalized groups. as such, it is a mechanism of power, intended to reaffirm the 
precarious hierarchies that characterize a given social order. it attempts to recreate simultane-
ously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator’s group and the “appropri-
ate” subordinate identity of the victim’s group. it is a means of marking both the Self  and the 
other in such a way as to re-establish their “proper” relative positions, as given and reproduced 
by broader ideologies and patterns of social and political inequality.
the underlying motive and inherent power dynamics displayed in crimes moti-
vated by hostility or prejudice differentiate them from regular crimes. Victims are 
often members of, or affiliated to, a subordinated and stigmatized group, while 
perpetrators often occupy a more dominant identity or status in relation to their 
victim(s) (lyons, 2006). however, the identity of the aggressor is often irrelevant 
to the hostile motivation of the crime; rather, it is the victim (or any other person) 
who subjectively determines whether they are being subject to hostility based on 
their identity. here, the power to ascertain and report an offence as a hate crime 
lies with the victim. the rationale for this, and the broad operational definition 
employed by the police, is to instill confidence in victims to report incidents where 
they otherwise might not have done so.
the relevant laws may all refer to hostility rather than hate, but they differ 
slightly to account for cultural variances (see Chakraborti & garland, 2009; 
hall, 2013; Schweppe, 2012). northern ireland and Scotland additionally rec-
ognize Sectarianism, but northern ireland does not recognize gender identity 
(i.e. transphobia) as grounds for hate (duggan, 2013, 2014). merseyside police 
in england and Wales were the first force to recognize sex workers as a protected 
group and record hate crimes against them accordingly (Campbell, 2016, 2018). 
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Subsequently, north yorkshire police adopted this approach, while greater 
manchester police choose to record crimes committed against people from alter-
native subcultures. in July 2016, nottinghamshire police became the first UK 
force to treat misogynistic street harassment as a form of hate crime, following 
research undertaken by nottingham Citizens advice that claimed 38% of women 
respondents had experienced a hate crime and felt in part that it related to their 
gender (nottingham Citizens, 2014). increasingly, police forces are following 
nottinghamshire’s lead in recording hate crimes based on either gender or misog-
yny according to the individual force (mason-bish & duggan, 2019; mullany & 
trickett, 2018). awareness about the significant similarities between hate crime 
victimization and violence against women or gender-based violence means the 
academic debate around “gender hate crime” predates these recent activities (gill 
& mason-bish, 2013; mason-bish & duggan, 2019). as the topic has been placed 
on policymakers’ agendas once again through the law Commission’s review, a 
revived exploration of the broader issue is fitting.
the chapter begins with an overview of how hate crime legislation currently 
operates in england and Wales, examining the rationales for different types of 
protections. of importance here is the role identity politics played in creating 
demarcated hate crime categories which then became hierarchized. this inequal-
ity informs wider debates among scholars, policymakers and practitioners about 
differential treatment between hate crimes and toward victims. this assessment 
of emergent hierarchies is informed by perspectives on harm and notions of vic-
tim (un)deservedness. examining how this impacts upon victims’ access to justice 
and recognition, the chapter unpacks the socio-legal construction of victims and 
victimhood. in doing so, it demonstrates how early (male) scholars determined 
victim “legitimacy,” where identity and gender featured heavily in the production, 
application and rejection of knowledge and “expertise.” drawing on the broader 
victimological literature, the chapter explores the shifting positionality of crime 
victims in liberal social and political systems, alongside a gendered consideration 
of the backlash against the role of culpability, blameworthiness and legitimacy in 
determining a person’s victim status.
global academic and professional insight into violence against women has 
significantly expanded since the mid-twentieth century, with a wealth of gender-
based research, theory, policy and practice spanning domestic and international 
domains. as the more recent “hate crimes paradigm” gains greater recognition 
and acceptance, feminist scholars have begun to explore the law’s potential for 
reducing gender-based violence or violence against women; namely, what – if  any – 
differences it can offer in terms of criminal justice system experiences, responses, 
redress or punishments. this is of interest due to the current discussions around 
specificity – in this case, whether to address misogyny rather than gender in any 
extended hate crime provisions to better recognize that women are disproportion-
ately subject to hostility (from men). manne (2017, p. 19) asserts that misogyny 
has shifted from being commonly understood as an individualized, pathologized 
phenomenon affiliated to lone persons, to be considered as “serving to uphold 
patriarchal order [and] understood as one strand among various similar systems 
of domination.” prioritizing misogyny as a categorization, rather than gender, 
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is considered necessary to recognize the particular dangers, victimization and 
vulnerabilities women are exposed to as a result of patriarchal oppression on 
both individual and structural levels (gill & mason-bish, 2013; mason-bish & 
duggan, 2019). inherent complexities therefore exist when seeking to address gen-
der hostility or misogyny within the current (regimented) hate crime framework.
to demonstrate these complexities and limitations more clearly, the chapter 
presents two case studies. the first critically addresses the specific intersection-
ality of gender and sexuality that manifests in structural and interpersonal acts 
of violence against women who identify as other than heterosexual, highlighting 
the limiting nature of “siloing” model of hate crime compartmentalization. the 
second critically explores the nature and impact of online misogyny that is increas-
ingly manifesting on a global scale due to the rapid expansion of technology-ena-
bled communication. the analysis contained within each demonstrates how legal 
responses should recognize the gendered specificities of targeted violence against 
women, but proceed with careful consideration and implementation to avoid exac-
erbating social hostilities. finally, the chapter concludes by providing insight into 
necessary areas for consideration regarding gender, misogyny and hate crime.
thE hAtE crImE LEgIsLAtIVE FrAmEworK In 
EngLAnd And wALEs
in countries that recognize hate crime and legislate accordingly, variations in 
approach often link to societal demographics and socio-political contexts, with 
most indicating intolerance of prejudice-motivated harm by ascribing to a pen-
alty enhancement model. the office for democratic institutions and human 
rights (odihr, 2009) suggests that hate crime policy should refer to “current 
social problems as well as potential historical oppression and discrimination,” 
although countries that adhere to their protocols not bound to this guidance 
(p. 38). in england and Wales, hate crime legislation recognizes hostility and 
refers to the specific identity characteristics of race, religion, sexual orientation, 
disability and transgender identity. legislation differentiates between offences 
“aggravated” by racial or religious hostility, offences in which hostility (toward 
any of the five characteristics) can be grounds for “enhanced” sentencing pow-
ers, and offences of “stirring up” hatred. Scholars have noted criticism, concern 
and confusion around the differentiation of hate crimes from both other crimes 
and from each other (Chakraborti & garland, 2009). examining these legislative 
discrepancies provides insight into their nuanced differences.
Sections 29–32 of the Crime and disorder act 1998 outline basic offences 
that, when motivated by hostility on the grounds of race or religion, become 
aggravated offences. these include grievous or actual bodily harm; assault and 
battery; destroying or damaging property; threatening, abusive or insulting con-
duct toward someone with intent to cause fear of violence or provocation of 
violence, or cause harassment, alarm or distress; harassment and stalking; and 
putting people in fear of violence. the aggravating factor can be demonstrated 
through words, gestures or behaviors, or indicate motivation such as through 
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the victim’s affiliation to an identifiable group. these aggravated offences carry 
higher sentences to recognize the presence of hostility; an assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm ordinarily has a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment 
but 7 years if  racially or religiously aggravated. importantly, for accurate data 
collection, racially and religiously aggravated convictions appear as such on an 
offender’s criminal record and the police national database.
Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice act 2003 introduced enhanced 
sentencing in cases motivated by, or involving a demonstration of, hostility toward 
one of the five protected characteristics. the enhanced penalty cannot exceed the 
maximum sentence available for the offence, but the act provides grounds for 
increasing it within the stipulated range. While this is a matter of judicial discre-
tion, the judge must openly state in court the reasons for any sentence enhance-
ment as part of their decision. they do this at the end of the trial, unlike in cases 
involving aggravated offences that require the prosecution to prove the racial 
or religious aggravation during the trial. legislation pertaining to aggravated 
offences and enhanced sentences are separate. for example, a person charged 
with the offence of racially aggravated assault may be found not guilty of the 
racially aggravated part, but instead found guilty of the basic offence of common 
assault; however, the judge cannot increase their sentence using the enhanced sen-
tencing provisions as the charge began as an aggravated offence. Unlike aggra-
vated sentences, data collection in these cases is more difficult as the rationales 
for sentence enhancements (i.e. motivated by racial hostility) do not appear on 
offenders’ criminal records or the police national database.
finally, the public order act 1986 prohibits a range of conduct that is either 
intended or likely to stir up hatred on the grounds of race, or is intended to stir 
up hatred on the grounds of religion or sexual orientation (the penalties for all 
are the same). briefly, the conduct covered under this act includes words and 
behavior; displaying and distributing written material; public performances and 
plays; producing or directing programmes; or producing material with a view to 
it being displayed or shown in a programme. important differences exist between 
the nature of the conduct: stirring up racial hatred covers threatening, abusive 
or insulting elements, while stirring up hatred on the basis of religion or sexual 
orientation must be threatening as being abusive or insulting is not enough. this 
difference, and higher threshold, recognizes the tensions that may emerge because 
of some faith groups expressing religious or doctrinal opposition to homosexual-
ity, as well as divisions that emerge within or between religious factions. from a 
harm-reduction perspective, it is pertinent to note that there is no requirement for 
proof that hatred was stirred up; rather, the offences require proof that hatred was 
intended to be stirred up (or likely to be in the case of race).
it is evident, therefore, that hate crime laws exist within a punitive paradigm 
that seeks to impose greater punishments for the prejudice-based element of the 
offence. While increased punishments do not necessarily prevent crime, they may 
prove beneficial to the victim or their wider community in other ways. proponents 
of hate crime laws claim that increased punishments provide useful symbolic ges-
tures to victims and society about the refusal to tolerate certain types of social 
conduct (perry & alvi, 2011). however, these gestures will remain symbolic unless 
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supported by prosecution figures that, according to research, remain significantly 
low (Walters, Wiedlitzka, owusu-bempah, & goodall, 2017). on the other hand, 
critics of hate crime laws suggest that they unfairly enhance punitive sanctions 
for lesser criminalized forms of harm. Jacobs and potter (1998) were among the 
first to assert that the enactment of laws designed to address hate (or “bias,” as 
it is often referred to in the United States) indicated more of a political desire to 
keep the general population happy as opposed to having any real impact on harm 
reduction or crime prevention. most crimes, they suggested, comprise of some 
element of hate, prejudice, bias or targeting. nonetheless, politicians’ granting 
of such legislation generally meant that they would be seen as “doing the right 
thing” in addressing most victims, harm, crime and bigotry in a seemingly “new” 
form of legislation.
Variance in Responses to Hate Crime Laws
Subsequent issues to emerge in the hate crime debate include claims of segre-
gation (between regular and hate crimes), homogenization (under the umbrella 
term of “hate crime”), hierarchization (among different groups), exclusion (from 
official recognition) and denunciation (being measured against other groups). 
Carney (2001) offers a more nuanced insight into the development of the hate 
crime paradigm, indicating that this traditionally involves the targeting of an 
immutable characteristic; the interchangeability of victims; increased and com-
munal fear within the target group; repeated and/or heightened violence; greater 
psychological trauma; and victims’ reluctance or failure to report victimization. 
groups recognized in hate crime statutes have generally been selected based on 
incurring historical socio-legal persecutions, being over-policed (as offenders) 
and under-protected (as victims) (Chakraborti & garland, 2009). these ration-
ales are evident in many groups’ lobbying efforts to enact legal protections or 
offer legal redress for harms incurred because of identity prejudice. as such, con-
siderations of crime victims and their experiences have moved from focusing on 
the act to addressing the victim’s identity. demarcating hate crimes in this way is 
reminiscent of an identity politics approach to policy development (fraser, 2003). 
While this has resulted in more targeted approach to prejudice-based victimiza-
tion, the separate and fixed way in which identity categorization presently works 
creates a “siloing” effect. the construction of identity hierarchies in this manner 
both determines outcomes and creates disadvantages:
[…] hate crime policy has been formed through the work of lobbying and advisory groups who 
have had quite narrow remits, often focusing exclusively on one area of victimisation. this has 
contributed to a hierarchy within hate crime policy itself, whereby some identity groups seem to 
receive preferential treatment in criminal justice responses to hate crime. (mason-bish, 2010, p. 62)
these issues were, in part, the focus of the law Commission’s initial explora-
tion into whether hate crime laws in england and Wales required updating and 
amending. the review assessed (and dismissed) the benefits of extending the 
Crime and disorder act 1998 to include hostility demonstrated toward people 
on the grounds of disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity, while also 
examining the case for extending the public order act 1986 to include disability 
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or transgender identity. at that point, the inquiry was not required to consider 
whether the legislation should apply beyond the five protected characteristics. 
the ensuing report (law Commission, 2013, p. 8) proposed the establishment of 
new Sentencing Council guidelines relating to the five protected characteristics 
alongside improved recording of data via the police national Computer. it is 
evident that the review did not go far enough in its proposals, with the failure to 
address extending legislation to new groups indicative of a lack of awareness of 
academic scholarship highlighting the exclusionary and discriminatory nature of 
categorizations among and outside of those selected for an enhanced criminal 
justice focus.
Schweppe (2012, p. 177) has demonstrated how the recognized hate crime cate-
gories in the United Kingdom are minimal compared to some states in the United 
States that (variously) recognize: citizenship, economic status, family responsibil-
ity, matriculation, membership of labor organization, marital status, national ori-
gin, personal appearance, political orientation or affiliation, sex and social status. 
the existence of varied approaches to hate crime inclusion mirrors the subjec-
tive status of this particular type of harm. addressing hate or hostility from a 
more responsive criminal justice perspective requires dismantling existing, static 
identity categories that are too exclusive and limiting. this, Schweppe (2012, pp. 
182–183) suggests, is a necessary part of efforts to “depoliticise” hate crime:
[J]uries (or triers of fact) [should] determine whether, on the basis of the evidence before them, 
a hate crime was committed, rather than curtailing the operation of the legislation to a limited 
number of (albeit fully deserving) victim groups.
as well as improving inclusivity, this approach may also work in the wider 
public’s favor. despite several high profile cases, police campaigns and efforts at 
raising awareness among the public, confusion still exists regarding what consti-
tutes a hate incident or crime and who is protected in law (duggan & heap, 2014). 
a statement released by the home office (2013) appeared to include any form 
of hate or hostility, not just that directed to members of a demarcated identity 
group: “Crimes based on hostility to age, gender, or appearance, for example, can 
also be hate crimes, although they are not part of the five centrally monitored 
strands” (p. 11). following the 2007 murder of Sophie lancaster murder, the 
judge drew on the alternative appearance embodied by Sophie and her boyfriend 
robert maltby (who survived the attack) when summing up, describing the act as 
being a “hate crime” against goth subculture (garland, 2010).
Similarly, the merseyside police approach to addressing hate crimes toward 
sex workers demonstrates the flexibility of hate crime policy (Campbell, 2014, 
2016, 2018; Corteen, 2018). Campbell (2018, p. 61) argues that “sex workers” 
experiences fit established definitions foregrounding “othering” and social hierar-
chies, defining hate crimes as expressions of prejudice, discrimination and power. 
Vulnerability was central to this application, with sex workers embodying situ-
ational vulnerability and minority identity status, therefore, being subject to an 
enhanced risk of harm. as a result, Campbell’s research found that applying the 
hate crime model to violence against sex workers increased the status of these 
crimes and the seriousness of reports, improved victim care and dedicated services 
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that monitored investigations and directly investigated some crimes, and led to 
greater joined-up approaches ensuring safeguarding and justice for sex worker 
victims of hate crime. While the hate crime approach has not eliminated violence 
against sex workers in merseyside, Campbell (2018) argues that “it goes further 
than many other local regulatory approaches in the UK to prioritize sex worker 
safety, ensure justice and assert sex workers’ equal right to protection” (p. 69).
in hate crime law, reliance on identity categorizations is a double-edged sword. 
restricting hate crime to focus on members of minority groups might limit 
expansion (avoiding a situation whereby everyone falls under some form of pro-
tection, thus, renders the legislation meaninglessness), but selective exclusion may 
be interpreted by some as a signifier of worthlessness (hall, 2013). Suggestions of 
more inclusive approaches to recognizing the types of harm currently addressed 
by hate crime policies have evolved from reframing the concept as “targeted 
crime” (Stanko, 2001), through to “targeted vulnerability” (roulstone & thomas, 
2009) and most recently “vulnerability and difference” (Chakraborti & garland, 
2012). exploring these, and the potential recourse to human rights law (Schweppe, 
2012), mason (2014, p. 65) suggests that:
together, a combination of these approaches may ultimately assist criminal law to rise to the 
challenge of greater inclusiveness by recognising vulnerability to victimisation based, not neces-
sarily [on] all forms of difference but, rather, on forms of difference that have a claim to equal 
rights and freedom from unfair or unjustifiable prejudice.
the importance of conceiving of “vulnerability” beyond its traditional under-
standing has been addressed by duggan and heap (2014) who indicate that as 
well as previously recognizable “risk” factors (such as gender, age or ability), 
experiencing identity-based hostility, being vulnerable, and being subject to repeat 
victimization means hate crime victims have commanded a prioritized status in 
policy formulation. however, complications arise due to the separating out of 
responses according to different types of  identity, despite the similarities between 
these forms of victimization. the potential for duplicated information, inconsist-
encies in process, blurred boundaries as to what identity categorization might be 
more suitable (where multiple are present) and general misinformation regarding 
the action to be taken are some of the pitfalls of having multiple responses avail-
able for similar forms of victimization (duggan & heap, 2014).
on the other hand, mason-bish (2014, p. 31) guards against consolidation, 
stating that as criminal justice agencies have produced specific guidance for each 
strand (after consulting with victim groups and campaigners), “a generic hate 
crime policy might be unwieldy.” either way, encouraging victims to engage 
with a justice system that may cause them further trauma calls into question the 
usefulness of enhanced criminalization if  this results in victims being be doubly 
harmed – first by the initial incident, then by the CJS process. Victims of crime 
are required to engage with the CJS in a co-operative and collaborative manner 
if  they are to avail themselves of the type of (criminal) justice promoted and 
offered. hate crimes in particular encompass additional harms and consequences 
compared to non-targeted forms of victimization (iganski, 2002). the potential 
for hate crime victims – particularly those with additional vulnerabilities – to 
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face secondary harm because of an unsatisfactory CJS experience may render 
ineffective any enhancement in perpetrator punishment. nonetheless, the victim-
focused approach of hate crime policy and statute signifies a discernible shift in 
political policy and the role of the victim in the wider criminal justice system.
thE (rE)EmErgEncE oF VIctIm IdEntIty 
hIErArchIEs
the surge in UK academic and professional interest in (initially racial) targeted 
victimization in the late twentieth century was, in part, due to the re-emergence 
of victimology as an area of scholarly interest and the proliferation of surveys 
designed to provide data and insight into marginalized and/or vulnerable groups 
(bowling, 1999). this, coupled with wider social events linked to racial tensions 
and criminal justice responses to racial minorities, highlighted the plight of vic-
tims in criminal, social and political domains. deans (2010, p. 199) suggests that 
dedicated support groups enabled the “extraordinary political reinstatement” of 
the victim by promoting their political voice and reclaiming spaces while act-
ing on the victim’s behalf. Contrastingly, green (2006, p. 1) has critiqued the 
turn toward a “victimocracy,” underpinned by “the emergence of rule by victim 
groups” whose demands upon law and policy is tantamount to special treatment:
[t]oday to be classified as a victim is to be given a special political status, which has no neces-
sary connection with real hardship or actual oppression. Victimhood as a political status is best 
understood as the outcome of a political strategy by some groups aimed at gaining preferential 
treatment. in free societies groups often organise to gain advantages for themselves, but the 
increase in the number and power of groups seeking politically-mandated victim-hood raises 
some deeper questions.
Victims of crime have not always had access to recognition and redress in 
criminal justice, although this has been easier for some than others. the socio-
political development of the “victim identity” in historical contexts has variously 
assigned culpability, deservedness and legitimacy to victimhood. exploring this 
offers a conceptual framework within which to analyze the discussions around 
extending hate crime laws to include gender or misogyny given that hate crime 
studies are a relatively recent development in the victimological field.
rather than traditionally conceptualized as “innocent” actors in a criminal 
enterprise, the academic exploration of victimhood was founded on assessing the 
degree to which the victim was culpable for the commission of the criminal act. 
three distinct stages characterize academic and political discourse around the 
victim: their pre-nineteenth century determination as an “essential actor”; their 
mid-nineteenth to late twentieth century characterization as a “symbolic actor”; 
and their twentieth century onwards conceptualization as a “fragmented actor” 
(Kearon & godfrey, 2007, pp. 30–31). it was due to the scholarly focus during 
this middle, “symbolic” period that led to the victim occupying a greater role in 
the central/criminal justice stage, and is of most importance to analyses of hate 
crime victimization in particular. Key theorists linked to the development of vic-
timology include benjamin mendelsohn (1956), hans von hentig (1948), marvin 
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Wolfgang (1957), Stephen Schafer (1968) and Wolfgang’s student menachem 
amir (1971). these early (positivist, male) victimologists sought to investigate the 
nature of the criminal or victimizing act; the relationship between the criminal 
and his victim; the actions of either or both preceding the act, and the actions – 
if  any – taken by the victim to deflect or deter the victimization from occurring. 
their findings produced several victim typologies which were based on the vic-
tim’s identity characteristics, their level of responsibility (as indicated by their 
actions or behaviors), and the degree of attributable victim culpability. these 
scholars’ works set a precedent for what has since been reconceptualized and 
termed “victim-blaming,” with some victims being more adversely affected than 
others. Victim-blaming discourses first emerged in the 1940s when mendelsohn 
identified causal factors that held crime victims to account for the harms they had 
incurred. his aim was to boost crime prevention efforts using the information 
he gathered about victim precipitation, facilitation and provocation. Subsequent 
works by von hentig, mendelsohn and Schafer would indicate clear distinctions 
between identity characteristics and structural factors in terms of victim culpa-
bility. identity aspects, such as the victim’s age, gender or mental capacity, may 
go toward increasing their legitimate claim to victim status, while actions such 
as provoking a criminal response from an aggressor would lessen or negate this.
the emergence of victim typologies can be seen as linked to, and influential in, 
developing notions of victim “deservedness” which informs the degree to which 
victims are seen as more (or less) worthy of justice than others. this in turn can 
affect access to justice, particularly when coupled with pre-existing stereotypes. 
the popularity of these early victim typologies influenced further studies on con-
tributory victim precipitation. Wolfgang’s (1957) research into homicide indicated 
that this had often begun with a minor altercation but escalated due to the vic-
tim’s contributory factors (i.e. carrying weapons, instigating violence or retaliat-
ing). however, Wolfgang’s student menachem amir’s research into police reports 
on forcible rapes in philadelphia, United States added a new gendered aspect to 
victim blaming. Using police data, amir (1971) concluded that a fifth of the rapes 
in his (limited) sample were victim-precipitated, drawing heavily on prejudicial and 
sexist ideology when outlining the contributory factors such as the victim being 
intoxicated, acting or being dressed “seductively,” being of dubious reputation or 
known as sexually “available.” the impact of this supposed “expertise” was pro-
found and ongoing; rape and sexual violence continues to be one of the few crimes 
where the (female) victim’s reliability, credibility and potential culpability are scru-
tinized as closely, if  not more so, as those of the alleged perpetrator (Jordan, 2004).
the response from second-wave feminists was to highlight the gendered needs 
and experiences of female victims, many of whom had been physically or sexually 
abused by men and faced a significant lack of support services (Cook & Jones, 
2007; hoyle, 2007). the feminist critique exposed implicit bias in measuring vic-
tim “deservingness” while simultaneously highlighting the degree to which the 
“victim” label had become saturated with (masculinist) cultural meaning. they 
demonstrated how encroaching governance and governmentality was increasingly 
constructing victims as stakeholders in their own safeguarding (garland, 1996). 
this was particularly evident for women held accountable for their own safety 
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and the actions of those who harm them. the qualities associated to different 
groups of victims according to their identities, experiences or actions and behav-
iors gives an early indication as to why some groups of victims may be favored 
over others. the more blameless a victim (or group of victims) appear to be, the 
easier it is to push punitive law and order policies.
being at the bottom of  any hierarchy may be undesirable, but being omitted 
altogether means those in most need may have least access to help. people seen 
by the dominant majority in society to be troublesome or distasteful – for exam-
ple, rough sleepers, sex workers and those with problematic drug or alcohol 
dependencies – often find their needs deprioritized. their marginalization reinforces 
often-critiqued ideology behind the concept of  “victimhood” as encompassing 
passivity and suffering (miers, 1978). this imposed passivity is often exacerbated 
if  victims are also considered vulnerable and without autonomy. butler (2016) 
guards against disassociating vulnerability and resistance or agency, suggesting 
that an interrogation of  vulnerability may instead result in a greater understand-
ing of  agency. yet while there has been little problematization of  mainstream ide-
ologies of  passivity and vulnerability afforded to victims of  crime, changes have 
been evident among grassroots circles (godfrey, Cox, & farrall, 2007; newburn & 
Stanko, 1994) and gendered domains. in particular, criticisms against employing 
an unproblematized language of  vulnerability in relation to gendered victimiza-
tion have highlighted the wider deleterious effects:
our culture, politics, and academic criticism remain troublingly invested in a story of female 
fragility, a story based on a few key assumptions: women, children and non-masculine men are 
the victims of male violence, female injury demands society’s retribution, and pain renders the 
victim of violence helpless. (hagelin, 2013, p. 3)
feminists’ adoption of the term “survivor” to refer to women and children 
who have survived abuse, most usually from men, is a way of counteracting 
the disempowering passivity (and elements of culpability) which had come to 
be associated with the “victim” label (Kelly, 1988; rock, 2007). Survival is fluid, 
whereby victimhood appears static or disempowering (fohring, 2018). Surviving 
abusive experiences also involves a greater degree of personal investment and 
struggle to “make it” – something not necessarily captured in victim terminology. 
as Spalek (2006, p. 26) indicates: “Underpinning the ‘victim as survivor’ identity 
is the theme of individual victim as agent who has resisted their abuse to become 
emotionally and psychologically stronger.”
Similar critiques prompted nils Christie’s (1986) seminal work on the “ideal 
victim,” elements of which still permeate popular and political discourses around 
victims and victimization (duggan, 2018). Christie noted how legitimate vic-
tim status, or deserving victims, were popularly characterized in specific ways. 
they should be weak in relation to the offender, ideally female, sick, very old or 
very young. they should be virtuous, or engaged in legitimate, everyday activity, 
therefore blameless for what happened to them. they should be unrelated to the 
offender; this “stranger” element also implied that it is a person, not an organiza-
tion, who committed the (singular) offence. the offender should be big and bad, 
allowing the victim to elicit unqualified sympathy through their attained victim 
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status. the weak, vulnerable, disempowered victim contrasts the strange, scary 
and motivated perpetrator in a way that provides a clear dichotomy, or divisions, 
in numerous respects. Situating victims on binaries both against offenders and 
against one another leads to problematic hierarchies. Victim hierarchies based 
on the “ideal victim” categorization drew on victims’ innate identity character-
istics such as gender and age. Christie’s (1986) ideal victim concept marries with 
aradau’s (2004) “politics of pity,” whereby emotions toward victims are used by 
governments to reconstruct and manage their situation, as long as the suffering 
is recognizable, identifiable and induces sympathy. the nature of the suffering is 
not necessarily reflective of any inherent value but may feed into responses to it. 
exploring who, how and why individuals or groups become worthy of pity, and 
how this shapes criminal justice responses to them can be illuminating.
as outlined earlier, the current justice approach to hate crimes is one of 
enhanced punitiveness, with the rationale for additional penalties based on the 
prejudice harbored by the perpetrator toward the victim(s). mason (2014, p. 65) 
outlines the purpose of this, suggesting that “hate crime laws rely upon the mecha-
nism of punitive justice to achieve, not just the instrumental goals of retributivist 
justice, but also the wider symbolic goals of social justice.” therefore, laws have 
the potential to address socially or politically informed hostilities that can mani-
fest as hate crimes. the following section explores the dynamics of gender-based 
violence and violence against women, examining the contradictions between the-
ories of justice and the lived realities of harm to more fully explore the potential 
for hate crime statutes to address misogyny or gender hostility.
hAtE, hostILIty And VIoLEncE AgAInst womEn
Violence against women is currently being afforded an unprecedented level of vis-
ibility globally, with past, present and potential victims occupying a central role 
in this rhetoric. recent events such as the global #metoo movement has given 
a platform for many to share their experiences of sexual harassment and vic-
timization. a substantial amount of feminist research on gender-based violence 
(gbV) and violence against women (VaW) has highlighted women’s vulnerabil-
ity to violent victimization, seemingly based on gender alone. the World health 
organisation and United nations both estimate that 35% of women worldwide 
will experience physical and/or sexual violence at some point in their lives (fra, 
2014; United nations, 2015; Who, 2013). Similarly, reports indicate that up to 
70% of women globally have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from 
an intimate partner specifically (Who, 2013). patriarchy is evident in much of 
this violence, particularly when it is fatal; most domestic murders of women are 
by their male partner (aldridge & browne, 2003; howarth, Stimpson, barran, & 
robinson, 2009; howe & alaattinoğlu, 2018). often, the reasons given are indica-
tive of male entitlement: threats to his “honour” through her supposed insubor-
dination, promiscuity or infidelity; her rejecting him; her requesting a separation 
and so forth (dobash, dobash, & Cavanagh, 2009; howe, 2018). family rela-
tions can make it difficult for victims to escape abuse, particularly if  there is an 
expectation that women will remain in a relationship or face wider family abuse 
or condemnation (gill, 2014). in the United Kingdom, the forced marriage Unit 
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provides direct support to hundreds of victims annually, while the United nations 
estimate that many thousands of women are victims of family-perpetrated “hon-
our” violence annually across the globe (manjoo, 2012).
hate crime victimization research has indicated that gender can be a key feature 
in the disproportionate targeting of women. higher levels of vulnerability and risk 
of harm – particularly sexual harm – are notable among women with disabilities 
(Casteel, martin, Smith, gurkha, & Kupper, 2008; Sherry, 2010). Verbal, physical 
and sexual threats made by men toward muslim women who wear religious cloth-
ing such as the hijab or niqab illustrate a range of gendered elements, from expe-
riencing the voyeuristic “male gaze” through to expressions of male entitlement 
to women’s bodies (Chakraborti & zempi, 2012; zempi & Chakraborti, 2014). 
in their analysis of women’s experiences of street harassment, mason-bish and 
zempi (2019, p. 12) indicate how the gendered environment of public space is illus-
trative of structural hierarchies of power where “to be a woman in public is to be 
available for men’s comments.” mason-bish and duggan (2019) highlighted simi-
lar findings in their empirical research on gendered victimization, with women cit-
ing far greater and more frequent experiences of verbal and physical harassment.
Where hostility is directed at women as a group, the fear of violence – 
especially sexual violence – can lead to women altering their behaviors to reduce 
perceived risks even if  they have not directly experienced harm or threats (Jenness & 
broad, 1994). individual acts of violence against women send a message to all 
women that they should “stay in their place” (pickup, Williams, & Sweetman, 
2001, p. 20). the degree to which acts of violence against individual women can 
subordinate and frighten women on a wider scale has led feminist scholars to 
reconceptualize this, initially as “sexual terrorism” (Sheffield, 1992) and more 
recently as “domestic terrorism” (pain, 2014). it is notable that the use of this lan-
guage does not put VaW/gbV on par with discussions around “global terrorism” 
despite affecting women internationally. the conceptualization as terrorism indi-
cates how the potentiality of this actual or symbolic violence not only serves to 
regulate women, but also can cause them to internalize fears of victimization to the 
extent that this has detrimental consequences on their mental health (Silvestri & 
Crowther-dowey, 2008; Westbrook, 2008).
in terms of gbV/VaW, there is potential in considering victimization from a 
perspective of similarity rather than difference. Violence against women, as with 
other forms of recognized hate crime, affect both the individual and their wider 
community. this is why Carney (2001, p. 319) argues that “rape is the paradig-
matic hate crime.” drawing on the immutable characteristic notion of what char-
acterizes hate crimes, she asserts that like other hate crime victims
the rape victim is selected because she possesses and immutable characteristic – her gender …. 
rape is not an act of violence that simply happens to women – it is an act of hate that happens 
to women because they are women. (Carney, 2001, pp. 319–320)
the failure to consider rape as a gendered hate crime may reflect the status 
of law as a traditionally androcentric domain (macKinnon, 1991). the inher-
ently masculinist nature of legislation (including hate crime laws) makes the 
consideration of gender or gendered perspectives for inclusion more difficult 
(gill & mason-bish, 2013). as with much discourse around violence against 
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women, male agency is frequently removed or denied, especially cases of 
domestic or sexual violence where women are often framed as being manipulative 
in order for the crimes against them, or perpetrators of harm, to be excused or 
mitigated (howe, 2018). the “message” element of hate crimes is further evidence 
of the power of social regulation through the fear or threat of violence; individual 
violent acts work to subordinate members of the target group(s) by instilling fear 
among group members (Westbrook, 2008). as well as focusing on crime preven-
tion, this may also involve dealing with or managing the impact of crime once 
event has taken place.
While victim policy remains focused on fitting “new” categories of victims into 
existing moulds, victims’ specific needs or wants will remain unmet. With regards 
hate crime, demarcating along identity lines or arbitrarily enhancing the criminal-
ization of existing offences is unlikely to reduce or prevent targeted victimization. 
an examination of the social and economic factors underpinning such prejudice – 
perhaps especially that which is gendered – must also be present to effect positive 
change. to do this requires adequate recognition that people embody multiple 
(minority) identities, therefore, may be more vulnerable to targeted victimization 
else victims “fall through gaps”:
Conceiving of hate crimes simply as offences directed towards individual strands of a person’s 
identity fails to give adequate recognition to the interplay of identities with one another and 
with other personal, social and situational characteristics. (Chakraborti, 2015, p. 17)
the concept of “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1989) seeks to remedy this by 
recognizing and providing space for different sites of identity to meet – or inter-
sect – as parts of a whole. intersectionality usually refers to the different identities 
one person will embody (e.g. their race, gender, class, age, etc.) at any given time. 
this means addressing the different aspects of a person’s identity that may have 
resonance in the victimization they have experienced, or render them more a vulner-
able target due to the intersections of race, ethnicity, transgender identity, class and 
disability (Chakraborti & zempi, 2012; meyer, 2008). research on people’s experi-
ences of prejudice on multiple bases has indicated the futility and falsification of 
trying separate out intent or impact along identity lines (fogg-davis, 2006; lloyd, 
2005; Spelman, 1990). therefore, addressing intersectionality and targeted victimi-
zation at policy level may be more effective if focused on harmonizing, rather than 
separating out, identity-based initiatives (duggan & heap, 2014). for women in 
particular, situating intersectionality alongside gender indicates the complexities 
of the current hate crime siloing approach and the impact of excluding gender or 
misogyny as a discreet category. to assess these issues in more depth, the following 
section explores two case studies: the first addressing the intersectionality of gender 
and sexual orientation in lesbian women’s victimization, and the second outlining 
how misogyny manifests in the online gender-based victimization of women.
Case Study One: Intersectionalities of Gender and Sexual Identity in Violence 
Against Women
Violence against women, alongside violence against people who identify as les-
bian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer (lgbtQ), is variously acknowledged 
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in domestic and international policy and law. the recognition of a woman’s right 
to be free from gender-based violence has been codified in international human 
rights, including the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women1 and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women.2 these pre-date the recognition of sexual orientation as requiring spe-
cific protection (established in 2011) despite earlier recognition that discrimina-
tion based on gender and sexual orientation render lesbians more vulnerable to 
victimization. the Special rapporteur reports on torture and Cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment noted how perceived deviance from socially 
constructed gender expectations had resulted in sexual minorities being dispropor-
tionately subjected to dehumanization, ill-treatment and torture, with a particular 
focus on specific allegations of abuses perpetrated against lesbians, including rape 
and sexual violence, as a means of intimidation and social regulation.3
there is a growing acceptance in perceptions of biological sex (i.e. male/
female) as being different to gender (i.e. man/woman) with socially constructed 
gender roles often being measured against a dominant form of heteronormativ-
ity (butler, 1990; meyer, 2008). these socially imposed gender roles guide the 
“acceptable” behavior of particular genders, reinforcing compliance or punish-
ing “deviance” with the threat or actuality of hate-based violence. Set against a 
backdrop of male violence toward women, research has indicated that women 
are “more likely to be attacked when they [are] not performing gender appropri-
ately” with the added dynamic that the victimization they experience functions 
as a regulatory tool to others (mason-bish, 2014, p. 24). the added dynamic of 
embodying an lgbtQ identity may exacerbate these perceptions of deviance – 
and exposure to victimization – along both gender and sexual orientation lines.
this regulatory approach has become increasingly evident alongside greater 
variations in the way people visibly express and identify their gender (dragiewicz, 
2008; Stearns, 1995). While gender does not determine a person’s sexual 
 orientation, the two links in the sense that a person’s gender is associated with 
how others infer their sexual orientation. additionally, sexual orientation is 
determined not only by a reading of the individual’s gender but also the gender(s) 
of those in whom they have a sexual interest (Stearns, 1995). in recent years, the 
socially constructed nature of gender has led to a multiplicity of both gender and 
sexual orientation identities emerging in line with a greater awareness of variance 
within these (i.e. non-binary, genderqueer, asexual, pansexual, etc.). however, 
where specificity remains constant – for example, lesbians being women with a 
sexual interest in other women – gender and sexual orientation coalesce within 
the lesbian identity.
bell and perry (2015) assert that homosexuality is associated with the vio-
lation of gender norms, therefore homophobia is considered to be informed 
by heterosexism; the promotion of heteronormativity alongside an ideologi-
cal stigmatization of non-heterosexual behaviors and identities (herek, 2000). 
heteronormativity promotes attraction to the opposite sex, so deviation from 
this norm simultaneously implies gender role deviation, which can lead to 
responses rooted in patriarchal fear and hatred. this may be implicit or explicit, 
given that patriarchy is understood to be “…a system of social structures, and 
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practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women” (Walby, 1989, 
p. 214). Societies shaped by religious doctrine and mandated by male authorities 
have developed attitudes and systems that promote and normalize male domi-
nance, supposedly on (male) interpretations of doctrine that depict women as 
inherently inferior or subservient to men. heteronormative regulation of wom-
en’s identities, behaviors and expressions embodies the heteropatriarchal notion 
that women are submissive to men, which in turn emphasizes the heterosexual 
dynamic of violence against women (hearn, 1998). this dynamic plays a signifi-
cant role in hate crimes committed against women generally, and lgbQ women 
specifically as the interactional dynamics between sexual orientation, gender, and 
patriarchy creates a toxic environment for those who do not conform to expecta-
tions. however, to capture the gendered nature of this victimization, it is more 
accurate to describe this as “lesbophobia” (robson, 1992).
VaW and lesbophobia/homophobia share characteristics, such as often taking 
the form of “low-level” victimization (i.e. verbal abuse, intimidation or threats of 
physical assault) reported to peers or third parties rather than authorities. these 
incidents rarely result in victims accessing any form of criminal justice, or even 
receiving wider public attention. the presence of a sensationalist element can 
instigate media coverage, particularly if  it conforms to popular tropes. an exam-
ple of this was the voluminous press attention paid to a 2019 incident involv-
ing two women attacked on a bus by four teenage boys in london, england. 
the group verbally harassed the women in a sexually aggressive manner, includ-
ing demands that they kiss for the boys’ entertainment. Upon failing to do so, 
members of the group physically attacked the women whereupon the image of 
their bloody and distraught faces quickly gained traction in the press. Several 
boys in the group were charged with aggravated hate crime offences (bbC news, 
2019). as there is no gender or misogyny hate crime strand currently available, 
and as the women identified as lesbian, pursuing the case as hostility based upon 
sexual orientation prejudice appears prudent. however, this incident was inher-
ently misogynistic – it was the women’s gender and their sexual identity that was 
being centered on in the demands made for the boys’ voyeuristic entertainment. 
furthermore, it was the women’s insubordination to the boys’ demands to kiss 
which resulted in them being subject to male violence; their sexual identities alone 
were not the initial grounds for hostility. therefore, the women’s gender is crucial 
to understanding this incident, yet it will be pursued as a homophobic hate crime.
lesbians who alter their appearance or behaviors in an attempt to “pass” as 
heterosexual to deter lesbophobic/homophobic victimization from heterosexual 
men may avoid this, but instead be subjected to sexist or misogynistic abuse due 
to the relative impunity with which men’s verbal hostility toward women is treated 
(Connell, 1992; ferraro, 1996; mason-bish & duggan, 2019). Social theorists have 
noted how societies (and the labels they produce) variously create and reinforce 
roles and norms through seemingly everyday practices which become embedded 
to the point of naturalization (goffman, 1974). inherent power structures func-
tion to construct hegemonic perspectives on identity, which inform social institu-
tions and cultural practices (Connell, 1987). the regularity and familiarity of 
these structured actions serve to reinforce their naturalization, only becoming 
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evident when imposed “norms” are transgressed in some way (messerschmidt, 
1993). however, rather than demonstrating the multiplicity of ways of being, 
these transgressions may result in reinforcing the naturalized construction of the 
pre-existing state of being. notions of difference, therefore, are assessed along 
hierarchical lines and benchmarked against this pre-existing state; actions to rein-
force, sustain or impose divisions may be read as “doing difference” (perry, 2001) 
in that the symbolic nature of targeting based on difference reinforces segrega-
tion as natural rather than problematizing it. men’s verbal or physical hostility 
toward lesbians invokes this hierarchy, initially at the point of expression and 
subsequently in the absence of social condemnation.
responses to targeted abuse have sought to capture the wider social dynam-
ics informing prejudice. drawing on goffman’s idea of “framing,” Snow and 
benford (1988, 1992) explored the potential of  “collective action frames” in pro-
viding foundations upon which social campaigns are built. these campaigns are 
characterized by shared action-oriented beliefs and used to negotiate the wider 
socio-political environment that embeds and responds to activism. lesbian (and 
gay) anti-violence movements have used collective action frames to expose the 
structural factors informing and sustaining lesbophobic/homophobic prejudice 
in a given society. however, Jenness and broad (1994) demonstrated how a gen-
dered analysis did not feature as prominently in these movements as it had in the 
feminist arena. the failure to recognize the impact of patriarchy in lesbophobic 
(and homophobic) victimization created a distance between the two movements 
where a shared approach was needed. intentionally or otherwise, critiques of 
patriarchy at the time developed the notion of “sexual terrorism” along heter-
osexual lines. Sheffield (1992, p. 392) defined sexual terrorism as “a system by 
which males frighten and, by frightening, dominate and control females” through 
actual and implied violence. the implied element was of significance as it speaks 
to the socially controlling potential of  fear that serves to regulate behaviors. the 
notion of sexual terrorism expands on brownmiller’s (1975) work which indi-
cated how men benefited from social control techniques (such as instances of 
rape) which primarily affected women, even if  they were not complicit in mani-
festing these. davis (1994) also noted the base level at which such control can 
operate in public environments, citing street harassment as a means through 
which to remind women of their vulnerability to sexual violence. the appropria-
tion of the language of terror was more recently adopted by pain (2014) who 
argued that within the private sphere, domestic violence can be considered a form 
of “everyday terrorism.”
the wider turn to patriarchy and the framework of structural analysis it 
offered in highlighting women’s victimization at the hands of male perpetrators 
was fundamental to connect instances of violence across time periods, cultures 
and societies. indeed, as Caputi (1992, p. 240, original emphasis) noted, “one of 
the most significant achievements of the Women’s liberation movement has been 
the naming of sexual violence as a systematic form of patriarchal oppression.” 
this in turn necessitated a gendering of the subjects (usually women) and objects 
(usually men) of fear, as well as the types of violence involved. Certainly, many 
cases of men’s violence toward lesbians comprises of a sexualized component that 
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addresses the woman’s gender and sexual orientation in a threatening manner. 
nonetheless, Jenness and broad (1994) highlighted the failure to apply this gen-
dered analysis to lesbophobic/homophobic victimization. examining several US 
anti-violence campaigns that were either gay and lesbian-sponsored or feminist-
inspired, they discovered (at the time) that:
there is no advice given regarding whether women should report the rape to a gay/lesbian anti-
violence project, a feminist-sponsored anti-violence project, or both. thus, violence against 
lesbians as women is omitted from the work of gay and lesbian-sponsored anti-violence projects. 
(Jenness & broad, 1994, p. 414, original emphasis)
this separation continues in societies where hate crime legislation exists. 
lesbian women form a minority cohort in both homophobic hate crime and vio-
lence against women data, research and policy. in foregrounding gender, the VaW 
literature prioritizes the experiences of “women” but may overlook some of the 
nuanced aspects affecting lesbian women specifically. on the other hand, in fore-
grounding sexuality, homophobia scholarship may overlook women’s experiences 
specifically when seeking to account for hate and bias based upon sexual orienta-
tion prejudice. therefore, lesbian women’s intersectional experiences may be side-
lined or omitted on the basis of both gendered and sexuality differences by virtue 
of not being dominant in either domain, but do feature in hate crime paradigms. 
by comparison, violence against heterosexual women – who do not occupy a 
recognized protected characteristic – does not enter the hate crime framework of 
analysis based on gender alone.
Case Study Two: Misogyny in the Online Gender-based Victimization of Women
the advent and proliferation of social media is a key element of social change that 
features heavily in contemporary experiences of gendered or misogynistic victimi-
zation (Khosraviknik & esposito, 2018). Social media facilitates greater inter-
actions between people in virtual spaces, with free-to-use platforms Facebook, 
Instagram and Twitter dominating among the most popular forums where peo-
ple can indulge their desire for “constant connectivity” (Keipi, nasi, oksanen, & 
rasanen, 2017, p. 2). Since its creation in 2006, Twitter in particular has become 
an immensely prevalent means of sharing information and comment globally. 
however, alongside the rise in popularity of social media has been a prolifera-
tion of harmful and problematic behaviors leading to the development of a “new 
frontier for spreading hate” (banks, 2010, p. 234). hardaker (2013) outlines how 
the “trolling” of individuals involves targeting them for abuse and harassment, 
usually by unidentifiable people, in a manner that can escalate very quickly in 
a largely unregulated cyberspace. the use of this term for online misogyny spe-
cifically has been critiqued on the basis that it “does not adequately capture the 
sexually explicit rhetoric, stark misogyny, or violence of contemporary gendered 
cyberhate” (Jane, 2017, p. 65). instead, Jane (2017, p. 64) offers an overview of how 
these behaviors have also been variously described as “cyber harassment” (Citron, 
2014), “technology violence” (ostini & hopkins, 2015), “technology-facilitated 
sexual violence” (henry & powell, 2015, 2018), “gendertrolling” (mantilla, 2015), 
“cyber VaWg” (United nations, 2015) and “cybersexism” (poland, 2016).
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the proliferation of terms addressing the gendered nature of online abuse has 
emerged in tandem with research on the issue. a Un report (2015) which evi-
denced the significantly gendered nature of online hostility detailed how almost 
three-quarters (73%) of women and girls had experienced or been exposed some 
form of online violence, with those at heightened risk being aged between 18 and 
24 years old. organized forms of this “cybersexism” involves men using tech-
nology to express their vilification of, and power over, women (poland, 2016, p. 
3). in the gaming world, the online abuse of high-profile women became prolific 
enough to be termed #gamergate (braithwaite, 2018). in the United Kingdom, 
women with high profiles have been targeted, including Cambridge professor 
mary beard (who received bomb threats following a television appearance), 
Caroline Criado-perez (who received rape and death threats for her campaign 
to have Jane austen represented on a sterling bank note) and labor mp Stella 
Cresey (who received rape threats for publicly supporting Criado-perez’s cam-
paign) (hardaker & mcglashan, 2016, “real men don’t hate women”: twitter 
rape threats and group identity). While two of Criado-perez’s abusers – isabella 
Sorley and John nimmo – were jailed for several weeks, for the most part misogy-
nistic abuse remains unchallenged or unreported on Twitter.
the rise in “technology-facilitated sexual violence” (henry & powell, 2015, 
embodied harms: gender, shame, and technology-facilitated sexual violence) 
goes far beyond harassment, encompassing threats, image-based abuse, cyber-
stalking, impersonation and a phenomenon directly linked to the cyber domain: 
doxing. doxing, or disseminating someone’s personal information online with-
out their consent, incites internet antagonists or encourage and enable people 
to “hunt targets offline” (Jane, 2017, p. 68). however, the futility of policing the 
vast number of sexist, misogynistic or threatening comments made to online 
women commentators means tolerance levels of certain types of online abuse 
alter accordingly to the point where such behavior is expected or even anticipated 
(moynihan, 1993). bannister and Kearns (2009, p. 182) have indicated how
the sociospatial situation in which we find ourselves both influences our predisposition towards 
tolerance and determines a set of other drivers of the tolerant response, so that our thresholds 
of tolerance are spatially specific and spatially variant.
Consequently, some types of behavior – or some types of victim – may become 
acceptable in settings where levels of tolerance and behavioral expectations fuel, 
lessen or fundamentally alter perceptions of “legitimate” victimization.
the anonymity afforded to users breeds otherwise morally objectionable 
behaviors that inform enhanced notions of disinhibition and de-individuation 
(Khosraviknik & esposito, 2018). trolling on Twitter has provided ample evi-
dence of the “normalising of deviancy,” where ordinary people are increasingly 
guilty of new forms of deviance in comparison to traditionally deviant criminal 
behaviors, which are increasingly seen as normal (Krauthammer, 1993, p. 20). 
What may begin with isolated commentators can quickly become groups of peo-
ple actively harassing a particular target. therefore, linked to de-individuation is 
the rise in group salience and polarization, often achieved by bringing previously 
diverse individuals or fragmented groups together through fostering “a collective 
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identity and sense of community” (banks, 2010, p. 234). these communities 
engage in prejudice enacted through “hate speech”; hatred is expressed against 
particular targets while they are simultaneously excluded from
participating in the broader deliberative processes required for democracy to happen, by ren-
dering them unworthy of participation and limiting the likelihood of others recognising them 
as legitimate participants in speech. (gelber, 2011, p. 198)
hate speech can incite physical violence. Williams’ (2006) research demon-
strated the virtual and physical offending patterns of perpetrators of online 
misogyny. this is evident through the rise of online groups of men who identify 
as “involuntary celibates,” otherwise known as “incels.” incels are an increasingly 
global phenomenon whose actions and beliefs are reminiscent of patriarchal ide-
ologies imbued with misogynistic values. online communities of incels are mainly 
composed of men who share the collective experience of being denied sex by 
women; this “inceldom” is characterized as incredibly self-loathing and aggres-
sive toward anybody who is sexually active (Williams, 2018). occupying areas 
of the internet commonly referred to as the “manosphere,” incels upload blogs, 
forums and podcasts linked to men’s rights activism, regularly decrying femi-
nists and women’s groups by using misogynist language and imagery (marwick & 
Caplan, 2018). members seek encouragement and justification through engaging 
in online discussions through social media platforms; sometimes implicated in 
attacks labeled as “gender terrorism” by the mass media (Squirrell, 2018). the 
activities demonstrated by members of these groups illustrate the inherent dan-
gers of involuntary celibacy ideology within a wider misogynistic online sphere. 
this includes vitriolic backlashes against supposed “feminist agendas” and anti-
rape efforts, with many claiming that rape culture is little more than a feminist-
inspired moral panic (gotell & dutton, 2016). marwick and Caplan (2018, p. 70) 
demonstrate how men’s rights activists rely on adverse feminist reactions, often 
manipulating academic work to reinforce and justify their claims to deluded 
feminist agendas. the largely unrestricted nature of the internet means that the 
misogynistic language and toxic views about women that are central to the invol-
untary celibate agenda may encourage individuals to commit violent crimes in 
the real world.
incel group dynamics allow for a collective loss of individuality and, in turn, 
personal responsibility for activities otherwise deemed morally abhorrent. the 
growth of shared ideologies leads to the formation of cyber “mobs” (Citron, 
2009) whose identities are often polarized from those they seek to denigrate. the 
expression of strong, inflammatory and often controversial opinions are designed 
to attract the attention (and support) of likeminded others, and are more easily 
fostered in an online – as opposed to physical – environment. Known as “flam-
ing,” members’ engagement in such behaviors help reinforce the collective identity 
uniting affiliates while also setting up the context in which “martyrs” – those who 
act out their hatred – emerge. Jane (2017) has indicated how the evolution of such 
“flaming” behaviors when targeted at women specifically highlight the inherent 
misogyny that has come to shape the collective targeting of women while also 
raising the profile of men affiliated to such abusive rhetoric.
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the 2014 isla Vista Killings and the 2018 toronto Van attack indicate the 
potential power of these cyber-dynamics. in isla Vista, 22-year-old eliot rodger 
uploaded an autobiographical manifesto and youtube video where he outlined his 
misery, loneliness and aggression, blaming women for him still being a virgin; soon 
after, he killed six people and injured a further fourteen before shooting himself. 
incels who considered rodger a martyr for the cause and a hero lauded him online. 
among them was toronto resident alek minassian, who posted a facebook status 
praising eliot rodger: “the incel rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow 
all the Chads and Stacys! all hail the Supreme gentleman elliot rodger!” (bbC 
news, 2018). moments later, minassian drove a large van into members of the 
public, killing 10 people and injured 14 more. as before, several online posts sur-
faced praising minassan as a community hero and thanking him for his service to 
the “cause.” Such evident male entitlement indicates a correlation between patri-
archal ideals of rights and expectations, particularly around women’s bodies and 
sexuality; this is espoused by incel ideology that in turn justifies gendered acts of 
aggression and violence (deKeseredy & Schwartz, 2016).
the power of virtual condemnation becomes more powerful as global con-
nectivity increases. With this comes the potential for the enhanced persecution of 
those accessing such spaces. Khosravinik and esposito (2018, p. 55) suggest that 
while academic insight into cyberhate has evolved rapidly:
gender has not received sufficient institutional and academic attention as a source of hate in its 
own right. While the dangers and risks of the digital world are well acknowledged, we still lack 
a clear grasp of what it actually entails being a woman navigating the cyberspace, and which 
specific threats and troubles this journal can bring about.
in their research into victims of online misogyny, lewis, rowe, and Wiper 
(2018, p. 528) indicated how discerning actual hatred was difficult as “perpetra-
tors seemed not to hate women in a categorical sense but rather to be motivated 
by a perception that women engaging in feminist debate were transgressing appro-
priate gender roles.” in other words, it is a powerful, cheap and almost effortless 
way to silence, control and contain women in virtual spaces. Similarly, d’Souza, 
griffin, Schackleton, and Walt (2018) explored the failure to legislate against gen-
der hate speech in australia, showing how the nature and impact of this speech, 
alongside the direct and indirect harms affiliated to this form of victimization, 
highlighted the silencing impact gender hate speech can have on all women – not 
just those directly targeted by such hostility. they argue that regulating gender 
hate speech is necessary to enhance women’s agency, particularly in the public 
domain, allowing them equal access to civil society.
the open nature of such spaces and wider visibility to others beyond the 
intended targets means the impact can be much wider ranging. Weinstein (1992) 
categorized the collective fear of a victim’s cultural group following the victimi-
zation of members of that group as the “in terrorem” effect to demonstrate how 
wide the impacts of harm can resonate. Jenness and grattet (2001, p. 179) argue 
that states have a responsibility to ensure the safety and security of vulnerable 
groups in a way that affirms “prosocial values of tolerance and respect” to wider 
society. the enactment of laws against such harm sends an important message 
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that liberal democracies have a “strong interest … in promoting diversity and 
demonstrating equal concern and respect for all citizens” (al-hakim & dimock, 
2012, p. 572). the failure to fully implement such laws and safety practices may be 
rooted in structural notions of victim-blaming directed toward women targets of 
gendered cyberhate; instead of support and assistance, they incur further shame 
and blame in a manner reminiscent of traditional forms of domestic, sexual and 
gendered victimization prevention “advice”:
advising or coercing women to opt out of or dramatically change their online engagement is a 
form of digital disenfranchisement. it is at odds with the recognition by an increasing number 
of nations that equality of access to affordable and effective broadband is vital for nations’ 
economic and social development. (Jane, 2017, p. 73)
in line with traditional approaches to gendered victimization, directing the 
(female) cyber victim to modify, limit or forgo their online presence is an easier 
and more convenient activity than seeking out or reprimanding the (male) cyber 
perpetrator.
concLusIon
the exclusion of gender or misogyny from hate crime protections in england and 
Wales has been founded on several grounds: women not constituting a “minority,” 
the presumption that much of the victimization they experience takes place within 
the context of an interpersonal or familial relationship, and the fact that legisla-
tive protections already exist to address many of these harms (mason-bish, 2014). 
it is true that not all violence against women is rooted in hate or hostility, but 
the invoking of such thresholds for debates on gender and misogyny hate crime 
(but not other strands) is telling. much gender-based victimization which involves 
repeat or targeted elements – for example, online hostility – would likely be charac-
terized as “more serious” in nature if  considered a hate crime. this in turn would 
require more active protections and responses by organizations and statutory 
agencies. the continued failure to include gender or misogyny is testament to the 
gendered power structures in society that determine which gender dictates the law. 
linked to this is the knowledge that, traditionally, engagement with the criminal 
justice system has not been a positive experience for women as victims of crime 
and may account for why many women remain silent about the harms they have 
incurred. therefore, if  the law was changed to incorporate gender or misogyny as 
recognized grounds of hostility for the purposes of prosecution, whether or not 
women would avail themselves of this legal redress remains to be seen.
those active as advocates, practitioners or campaigners in the field of violence 
against women prevention have also expressed caution about the ability of hate 
crime policy as it currently stands to address issues of intersectionality and diver-
sity in gendered harm at a sophisticated level (gill & mason-bish, 2013). While it 
is encouraging that the law Commission are looking at this issue again in light of 
ongoing cultural developments (i.e. #metoo), it is important to note that legisla-
tion which targets individuals and acts can only do so much; real change needs to 
come at a structural level. the prevalence of violence against women is the result 
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of unequal power relations between men and women in society (pickup, Williams, 
& Sweetman, 2001). many forms of male violence against women are reminiscent 
of existing hate crimes in terms of intent, approach and impact, yet the issue may 
not be with the gender of  the victim per se but the gender relations informing the 
aggressor’s feelings of entitlement and resentment toward the victim. this is why 
it is important to include in protections as it fits with the framework used for 
other characteristics. however, it is important to acknowledge that addressing 
gender or misogyny in hate crime legislation may do much for data collection and 
capture, but likely very little to effectively reduce actual victimization.
in terms of  whether it should be “gender” or “misogyny” that is recognized, 
valid arguments exist for both. While adopting “misogyny” would highlight the 
specificity of  this type of  abuse and who is affected, it risks being considered 
exclusionary (of  men) and potentially underused if  the term is one that people 
are unfamiliar with or misunderstand. adopting “gender” not only lends itself  
to greater inclusivity but also allows for people of  all genders (and none) to 
avail themselves of  these protections. in doing so, scholars, practitioners and 
policymakers will be able to clearly see the differences between who is (and is 
not) experiences or reporting gender hate crime, who/what this involves and 
what – if  any – criminal justice outcomes arise as a result. this is vital if  efforts 
to recognize, respond and reduce targeted victimization on the basis of  gender 
are to prevail.
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